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Abstract 
This paper treats the period just before the breaking out of the conflict in Croatia during the Yugoslavia crises. It 
is an attempt to provide answers of questions that concern the reasons for this war conflict by using the 
theoretical frameworks of two international relations theories, i.e. the “security dilemma” and the “prisoner's 
dilemma”.  
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1. Introduction 
In a situation where the federal Yugoslav bodies have become dysfunctional and maimedSerbia access to its 
new tactics in distribution of YNA troops in the Serb populated territories in Croatia. The strategy envisioned 
waiting for the Croats to provoke with the expected proclamation of independence. In such a turn of events the 
overwhelming military YNA would seize and retain these territories from Croatia. So if Croatia would want to 
leave Yugoslavia than it would be forced to do that without part of its territory. Croatia's desire for 
independence on one hand and the strategy of Serbia on the other, were diametrically opposed options. This 
paper is making analysis of what and why happened in the moments before the start of the war in Croatia using 
the theoretical concepts of security and prisoner dilemma. 
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2. Materials and methods 
We use qualitative methods and descriptive research. 
3. The security dilemma 
There were two sides. These are the Croats in fact the Republic of Croatia and the Serbs who live in Croatia 
supported by the Republic of Serbia. In our opinion, in the moments just before the start of the war in Croatia, 
they were in the so-called “security dilemma”. This theoretical framework suggests the one particular side (most 
commonly the state) in order to increase its own safety increase its own military capabilities or enters into 
alliances ( for more see [3]). Such behavior on one side can be seen and characterized as aggressive from the 
other party. This other party, as a respond to this will start undertaking similar measures. By this, both sides will 
come to a situation of increased tensions between them that can easily transform in to a real conflict despite the 
fact that neither side actually wanted. If the above mentioned situation is transformed in Croatia before the war, 
it can be see that the Croats and the Serbs were in a very similar situation as the theoretical situation in the 
security dilemma. Thus, seen through the prism of the Croatian Republic, they (the Croats) have adopted a new 
Constitution in response to the aggressive Serbian politics in Yugoslavia and because they taught that this will 
ensure stronger security. The Croatian Serbs interpreted this as an act of aggression aimed directly at them 
because of the changes in their status under the new Constitution. Thus the Croatian Serbs react with non - 
recognition of the Croatian authorities. This occurs almost everywhere, where Serbs lived in large number in 
Croatia. Furthermore, in order to increase their own safety, the Serbs are setting up barricades on roads. These 
actions, as seen by Croatian authorities were considered as pure aggression and disloyalty and according to this 
as a potential threat for Croatian sovereignty. This is the reason why the Croats reacted with the illegal buying 
of weapons from Hungary in order to increase their safety that would be definitely affected by the possible 
involvement of Serbia on the side of the Croatian Serbs. Those actions done by Croatia were interpreted as 
possible aggression over the Serbs and so on. 
This theory may partially explain the beginning of the war in Croatia. In a certain percentage it is believed and 
claimed that the conditions of this dilemma which refer to the non-existing will of conflict, were also met. 
Namely, under the security dilemma theory, none of the parties really wanted to enter into the conflict. Thus, 
without ignoring the existence of nationalists on both sides or the desire of certain groups for war, still it could 
be claimed that the war in general was not a desirable option for any party. Thus for Serbia and the President 
Milosevic, much more important contribution for achieving the slogan “all Serbs in one state” was B&H, and 
not the territories inhabited by Serbs in Croatia for which [1] he was ready to give up as a sign of goodwill if 
B&H would have stayed in future Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. In this scenario Serbia would have promoted 
itself as a stability and peace factor, and the Serbs in Croatia probably would have obtained much more than just 
a national minority rights by which the silent assimilation would have stop- see SANU memorandum [2] (for 
more see [4]).  On the other hand, the peaceful way out for Croatia from Yugoslavia with its full territory, even 
in places where Serbs were the majority, was certainly preferred option that would have saved many Croatian 
lives, cities, villages and  avoid huge damage. According to this the war was not cherished option for Croatia. 
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However if we want to be consistent to the elements of security dilemma then we must analyze the 
communication element too. The security dilemma suggest that the war should be result of the failure of 
communication between the parties i.e. having a situation with lack or no communication between the sides, or 
existence of bad communication which is wrongly interpreted. So in this case, perhaps some would argue that 
this requirement is not met i.e. that there was a satisfactory degree of communication between the parties (if not 
directly between the Serbs in Croatia and the Croatian government, then at least between the presidents of 
Croatia and Serbia). Still we do not agree in full with this because the existing literature claims that the 
communications between the two presidents (Milosevic and Tudjman), especially through their secret meetings 
was much more frequent during the war in B&H and were not so intensive before the beginning of the war in 
Croatia. We can even argue that the existing communication was on a level of badly interpreted communication, 
and this is still a failure in the communication. So we can say that this condition of security dilemma was also 
fulfilled accordingly. 
4. The prisoner's dilemma 
Perhaps a better representation could be done in the actual situation through the so-called “prisoner's dilemma”. 
If a graphic overview is made the situation would have looked like this (table 1):  
Table 1: Serbs living in Croatia and Serbia are marked as “S”  & Croats and Croatia are marked as “C” 
 C - cooperate C – do not cooperate 
S- cooperate The best possible outcome for 
both 
C– The best possible outcome 
S– Worst possible outcome 
S- do not cooperate S- The best possible outcome 
C–Worst possible outcome 
S–Intermediate acceptable 
outcome 
C–Intermediate acceptable 
outcome 
 
In the actual situation, i.e. the time before the beginning of the war in Croatia (officially still SFRY) there were 
two sides, namely, the Serbs living in Croatia and the Republic of Serbia on the one hand and Croats and the 
Republic of Croatia on the other side. If we transformed the two sides in the imaginary situation of “prisoner’s 
dilemma" and try to get the possible outcomes for the both sides we will get the table 1. So both sides had two 
options. Each of them can cooperate with the other party or not, which in this practical cause would mean 
starting a war with the other side. Let’s analyze the possible outcomes.  
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The first possible outcome is presented in the table 1 left corner up. In this case, both sides cooperate, i.e. not 
initiated military operations and agreed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Thus, the solution could have been 
found in a peaceful independence for Croatia which would have been recognized by Serbia, with a precondition 
that the Serbs in Croatia would receive something more than the usual civil and ethnic rights. In our opinion this 
would be acceptable for Croatia as long as it would connote creation of an independent Croatia with its full 
territorial integrity and sovereignty recognized by the Serbs and Serbia. Even in reality if this was acceptable for 
the President Milosevic [1] who gave his consent to such settlement for the Croatian question under the plan 
proposed by Lord Carrington (reasons for this could be seen at credits that Serbia would have obtained as an 
constructive player in the eyes of the international factor.  But also further on this should be compensated with 
the Bosnian question i.e. B&H would remain in the new Serbian dominated mini Yugoslavia). So, although this 
possible outcome might have been encountered with some disapproval and disappointing among certain 
nationalist groups, yet there is no doubt that the first possible outcome is advantageous variant for both sides and 
it have been possible only if both sides cooperated. Howeverthe chances of this outcome in that historical 
moment were less than the minimum but still possible. 
The second possible outcome is indicated in the left corner down. In this variant the Serbs and Serbia would get 
their best possible outcome unlike the other side - the Croats and the Republic of Croatia which would get worst 
possible outcome. This outcome would have occurred when one side - the Croatian, would have simply  rely on 
the good will of other side and would not undertake any actions naively hoping that the other side will cooperate 
and will also not take any actions. But the other side - the Serbs would have taken an advantage of the passive 
position of the other side and use it for a quick military strike that would result in a quick military victory. In 
this way, they would have been able to dictate the conditions for the peace agreement which will be the best 
possible outcome for Serbia and the Serbs but also the worst possible outcome of Croatia. In our opinion, the 
possibility for this scenario in reality was less than zero not just because of the prisoner’s dilemma logic, but 
also because of the existence of foreign factors. So it is very unlikely that Serbia (Yugoslavia) would have 
decided to be directly involved in a war that would have put an end of Croatia in a situation of the existence of 
the external factor that very likely would have not allow this (NATO, primarily the USA and Germany). 
The third possible outcome is virtually the same as the second except that in this outcome the sides are 
changing. So according to the third scenario which is marked in the right corner up, the Croats and the Croatian 
Republic will get their best possible outcome unlike the Serbs and Serbia, which will get their worst possible 
outcome. It is a situation Serbia and the Serbs would naively cooperate without undertaking any measures for 
their own safety and would have hoped that the other side would do the same. But the other side has taken the 
advantage of their passive position and initiated a quick and successful military attack over the places settled 
with Serbs in Croatia. This outcome as well as the previous was almost impossible. In fact hardly anyone in 
Croatia would dare to such a step having in mind that this will cause a direct involvement of military superior 
Serbia in the war, quite sure. 
Finally the fourth and final possible outcome is the situation marked in the right corner down. It is the outcome 
in which both sides gain something and lose something which is a secondary possible outcome acceptable to 
both sides. This outcome gets the best chances to occur and really happen according to the logic of “prisoner 
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dilemma". Thus the existence of fear that the other party will not cooperate and will try to attack first in order to 
achieve its best possible outcome, both parties actually enter into military conflict, which guarantees at least 
minimal realization of their goals. Thus the Serbs took control over the places in Croatia that were with 
predominantly Serbian population, and the Croats established their own military control above the rest of 
Croatia and gained factual independence. Of course, this scenario had bad sides and was accompanied by 
enormous sacrifices from both sides and enormous economic and material damage. 
So according to the logic of prisoner dilemma, not cooperation as an option chosen by one side almost always 
carries a more favorable outcome for the same side, regardless of actions of the opposite side. So the most 
predictable and the most possible outcome was the one that actually happened i.e. the forth one (table 1). 
Note: The “prisoner’s dilemma“ is a theoretical approach and not always fully includes all elements from the 
reality in a current specific situation. However, the situation between the Serbs and the Republic of Serbia on 
the one hand and Croats and the Republic of Croatia on the other hand, in the time of the period just before the 
start of war in Croatia, contains a good proportions of the elements of the prisoner dilemma, which in large 
percentage has a predictable outcome according to the logic of this theoretical framework. 
5. Conclusion 
By using the theoretical frameworks of two international relations theories, i.e. the “security dilemma” and the 
“prisoner's dilemma” this paper presented the conditionsandevents in the period before the breaking out of the 
conflict in Croatia from different points of view. However, we must note that this theoretical approaches not 
always include all the elements from the reality in a current specific situation.  
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